This pattern was interpreted as proof there was no danger. Over the next few years, multiple boosters showed signs of O-ring damage, yet performed flawlessly on-mission. Grounding the fleet wasn’t believed to be politically tenable the Shuttle was already late and over-budget. At that point, the organization had two options: Ground the nascent Shuttle fleet and design a fix for the problem, or keep flying the rockets and see what happened. One of the reasons NASA went ahead with the Challenger launch was due to what sociologist Diane Vaughan deemed the “normalization of deviance.” NASA had observed a burned O-ring during the second Shuttle mission and was well aware of the problem. NASA’s formal conclusion was that “It is possible, but not certain, that the crew lost consciousness due to an in-flight loss of crew module pressure.” Tests showed that neither impact with the ocean or the initial explosion could have shifted them. The switches in question were protected with lever locks, making accidental actuation impossible. Electrical switches on Smith’s chair had been moved as well. The air reserve found in the activated PEAPs matched consumption expectations if the astronauts had remained conscious for the duration. But the damage from hitting the ocean at 207 mph with a deceleration impact of more than 200 g destroyed a great deal of evidence. Whether the crew was conscious would have depended on whether the cabin was breached. Because Smith’s PEAP was mounted on the back of his chair, he could not have activated it himself. When NASA discovered the wreckage of the crew cabin, it found that three of the PEAPs had been activated, including the one belonging to Shuttle Pilot Michael Smith. PEAPS could provide crewmembers with approximately six minutes of air (albeit unpressurized air) in the event of a mishap. The crew of Challenger didn’t wear bulky pressurized space suits during lift-off, but they did have access to Personal Egress Air Packs, or PEAPs. This Washington Post story, written when the crew cabin was located, describes how “the explosive force of the initial fireball virtually shredded much of the orbiter into scores of pieces” and “tore open the crew cabin.” While the article doesn’t claim to know exactly when the crew died, the implication is clear. NASA never made an official statement on the matter, but heavily implied that the crew was killed instantly - a view reinforced by other astronauts and experts who spoke on-record at the time. In the wake of the disaster, it was widely believed that the crew cabin was destroyed in the explosion. What happened to the crew was even worse. The NASA engineers that pushed for delay due to the unusually low temperatures and the effects this could have on the Shuttle’s O-rings were overruled by managers eager to complete the mission. The technical and safety evaluations that led to the launch failure were inexcusable.
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